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1REDISTRIBUTION AND SUBSIDIES FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION
Carmen Beviá and Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe
Abstract
The …nancing of higher education through public spending imposes a transfer of
resources from taxpayers to the university students and their parents. We provide
an explanation for this phenomenon. Those who attend higher education will earn
more income in the future and will pay more taxes. People whose children do not
attend higher education, however should agree to help pay the cost of such education,
providing that the taxes are su¢ciently high to ensure that there will be an adequate
redistribution in favor of their own children at some time in the future.
JEL classi…cation numbers: D71, H21, H52.
Key words: Higher Education, Taxation, Redistribution.
21 Introduction
In most countries the cost of public higher education is …nanced mainly by the govern-
ment out of general tax revenue. In Spain, for example, only about 20% of total cost
was covered by the fees paid by students in 1996, while the remaining 80% was cov-
ered by public transfers (see Calero (1996)). It is also well known that most university
students come from middle and upper income groups. Such empirical evidence has
led some authors to conclude that public …nancing of higher education brings about a
regressive e¤ect on income distribution (see Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) and Nerlove
(1972)). Leslie and Brinkman (1988), however, conclude that this regressive e¤ect is
o¤set once the progressive nature of the tax system is taken into account. The follow-
ing question, however, remains to be answered: Since higher education is an activity
that provides direct bene…ts by increasing future earning power, to subsidy higher
education means to subsidy an activity that provides direct bene…ts to a privileged
minority only. Why then, in a democratic society, should a majority of voters, who do
not have access to higher education, agree to subsidize it for the wealthiest segment
of the population? As this seems to be the case throughout western societies, many
researchers have developed theories to explain this phenomenon.1
The explanation most frequently o¤ered is that higher education creates “spill-
overs”, or positive e¤ects, for the rest of the economy. It would, therefore, be unfair
to impose the entire cost of higher education on the students and their families. If
this were done, families would tend to under-invest in higher education. Since those
who receive higher education and generate the “spill-over” cannot force its indirect
bene…ciaries to pay for the bene…ts they receive, it can be accomplished through the
government, via taxes.
An example on this vein is Johnson (1984), who suggests that education not only
increases the productive skills of those who receive it, but can also indirectly bene…t
those who do not, via “complementarities” in the production process. Creedy and
Francois (1990) develop a more complex model. They assume the existence of a
positive e¤ect of education on the growth rate of a country. This, in turn, increases
the future income of the non-educated individuals, who, providing that the positive
e¤ect is great enough, will agree to pay higher taxes to continue …nancing higher
education. However, as Creedy and Francois admit, there is no empirical evidence
of the existence of such spill-overs, and far less of their degree. This explanation,
therefore, may lose some of its appeal.2
Another explanation is that o¤ered by Fernandez and Rogerson (1995): When
1We refer exclusively to “democratic” explanations. That is, those that are based on some type of
collective decision, by majority vote. We could provide an alternative explanation for non-democratic
societies: Political power is concentrated in the upper income group and they can extract the desired
resources from the other groups through coercive taxation.
2The available empirical evidence suggests that such spill-overs are higher for primary and sec-
ondary education and lower for higher education. (See, for example, Psacharopoulos (1985)).
3people vote on the size of a subsidy for education, they are also voting, implicitly,
on how many students should receive such a subsidy and attend university. A given
amount of subsidy determines the proportion of people who can go to university:
those above a certain income threshold. The level of this threshold is lower the
greater is the size of the subsidy. These authors show that, in some cases, a majority
of voters in the middle and high income brackets, can force the choice of a partial
subsidy, and thus, exclude low-income groups from attending higher education while
extracting resources from them, through the tax system.
Garratt and Marshall (1994) see the government as a provider of insurance. Only
the most skilled individuals can attend college. If parents are uncertain about the
ability of their children, they will be willing to insure themselves against the pos-
sibility of having able children and not being able to a¤ord their education. Thus
the families whose children do not attend college make payments as an insurance
premium.
In this paper, we propose a di¤erent explanation for the public funding of higher
education. As we have already mentioned, those who attend university will eventually
earn, on average, more income than they would have earned if they had not gone to
university. This, in turn, implies that the gross total income will increase, in the
future, due to the existence of higher education and so will the tax base. Moreover,
the greater the subsidy to higher education is, the greater the increase in future
income will be, as there will be more young people attending university. Let us
now suppose that transfers to lower income households are positively related to the
tax base. This means that today, families whose children have no access to higher
education, can anticipate that their children will bene…t in the future, since the
transfers that are made to their bene…t will be greater as tax collection increases
with the rise in the number of students. Of course, the higher the marginal tax rate
is, the greater the e¤ect will be, as it will determine how much of the increase in
income remains in private hands, (in other words, in the hands of those who went to
university), and how much will be redistributed among the society.3
As parents care about the future income of their children, they will be willing
to pay the extra taxes needed to …nance a high level of subsidy. As the level of the
subsidy increases, more people will choose to go to the university and tax revenue
from the former university students will grow.
Our main argument here is that there is a positive relationship between the per-
ceived degree of redistribution of taxes among a society, (measured by the marginal
tax rate), and the level of the subsidy that is allocated to higher education.4 To
3In order to avoid problems regarding the formation of expectations of future tax rates, we shall
assume, throughout the paper, that all people believe that the future tax rate will be the same as
the current rate.
4A similar idea is explored in Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), who propose a situation in which
people could vote for higher subsidies for day care, as it would induce mothers to join the work force
4sum up, the marginal tax rate determines what proportion of the increase in future
income due to education is redistributed among the society and how much remains
in private hands. This idea is not entirely new. It dates back, at least, to Nerlove
(1972) who believed that part of the subsidy could be regained through higher taxes
that should be levied on the upper-income levels, which are precisely those of the
professionals who have bene…tted from the increased subsidies for higher education.
Blomquist (1982) studies, in an optimal taxation framework, to what extent educa-
tional expenses should be deductible in order to maximize a Rawlsian social welfare
function. Allen (1982) shows that, in some cases, the worst-o¤ people are helped by
a linear tax consisting of a wage subsidy and a uniform lump-sum tax, which redis-
tributes from poor to rich. Barr (1993) states that if the subsidy to higher education
were zero, future tax-payers would get a dividend, via the increase in the tax base,
and thus, the government would eventually have to establish a subsidy to restore ef-
…ciency. Our argument is that this could be guaranteed, even in a situation in which
the subsidy were chosen by majority vote, with the voters trying to maximize their
own income levels. To make our point stronger, we consider the decisive voters to
be those families who do not, or cannot, send their children to university. The main
…nding of our study is that those families would vote for a positive subsidy to higher
education, and that such a subsidy would grow along with the level of the marginal
tax rate. This contrasts with the results of Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), as in
their case the decisive voters were always those who attend higher education.
In Section 2, we present the model and some preliminary results. Our model
is a human capital model, as attendance to university adds to productivity. We
assume that the society has to decide, by majority vote, the amount of the subsidy
that is to be allocated to higher education. When a family votes, they consider the
way in which a given level of subsidy determines the proportion of students that
attend university. In Section 3, we present some results on comparative statics. First
we explore the relationship between the level of subsidy chosen by the society and
the marginal tax rate. We …nd that, for reasonable values of the parameters, this
relationship is always positive. That is to say, the greater the marginal tax rate is,
the greater the level of the subsidy chosen by the society will be. Next, we study
the relationship between the altruism within the family and the level of the subsidy.
Surprisingly, we …nd a negative relationship between these two elements. To be more
speci…c, the more altruistic the parents are with regard to their children, the lower
the level of the subsidy will be. As parents become more altruistic, more families will
be willing to pay the cost of higher education, which implies that the proportion of
children at university will grow. Due to the structure of our model, the increase in
future income will not be su¢cient to compensate for the increase in the total cost
of higher education for the entire society, and thus, people will vote for a cut in the
and, hence, pay income tax.
5subsidy to avoid an increase in their taxes. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss some of
the weaknesses of our model.
2P r e l i m i n a r i e s
We present a model with two periods, labelled 0 and 1. In period 0 there is a
continuum of families that are composed of one parent and one o¤spring. Families
are characterized by a pair (y0;±) where y0 2 [0;1) is income earned by the parent
in period 0 and ± 2 [0;1) is the ability or “talent” of the child. We assume y0
and ± are independently distributed. Suppose, for instance, that the particular value
of ± depends on individual characteristics, such as intelligence, which we assume,
a priori, are unrelated to income. We denote by G(y0) and H(±) the cumulative
density functions (CDF) of y0 and ± respectively (g(y0) and h(±) represent the density
functions).
The total cost per student for the higher education system is k + c; where k>0
and c>0.T h et e r mk represents the implicit cost, i.e. foregone earnings. The term
c represents all explicit costs: tuition and fees, and room and board rates. There is a
crucial di¤erence in our model between k and c: The implicit cost k is not subsidized
at all while c can be subsidized by the government at a rate s; with 0 · s · 1: In
other words, families pay k+(1¡s)c if their o¤spring goes to university. For the sake
o fs i m p l i c i t y ,w ea s s u m et h a ts is independent of the characteristics of the families.
All decisions are made by the parents in period 0. Speci…cally, they must make
two decisions: First, they must decide, for a given s, whether or not they agree to pay
k +( 1¡ s)c. We assume that children are unable to borrow funds, and thus, cannot
a¤ord to pay their own fees, so that they can only attend university if their parents
are willing to pay for it. Secondly, parents must decide collectively, by majority vote,
the level of the subsidy that should be allocated to higher education.
In period 1, only the children live and their levels of income are determined both
by the income levels of their parents and by their attendance or not at university.
We assume that income in period 1, y1; for a child from a family with characteristics
(y0;±) will comply with the following pattern:5
y1(y0;±)=
(
y0 if the child does not attend university
(1 + ±)y0 if the child attends university.
2.1 Tax Structure
Taxes are levied according to the following linear equations:
t(y0)=b0 + ay0 where b0 · 0 and 0 <a<1 in period 0,
5We assume that all students graduate. The return from education does not depend on the number
of students. A more general treatment would allow for considering such a possibility, introducing
wage adjustments to changes in the supply of graduate students.
6and
t(y1)=b1 + ay1 where b1 · 0 and 0 <a<1 in period 1.
The marginal tax rate a is the same during both periods and is …xed by the govern-
ment. The lump-sum transfers b0 and b1 will vary to satisfy the budget constraints of
the government (see Subsection 2.3 below). These transfers can be seen as the guar-
anteed minimum income for every individual. They are assumed to be non-positive
to ensure that the tax function is progressive.
2.2 Parents’ First Decision
Here, we take the subsidy level s as given. We assume that the parents’ utility is
simply a weighted sum of after-tax income during period 0 and after-tax income of
their o¤spring during period 1. This utility will be di¤erent in the event that the
child attends university than it would be if he did not. To be more speci…c, if the
child attends university, the utility that the parent of a family (y0;±) enjoys is:
v(s;y0;±)=( 1¡ a)y0 ¡ b0 ¡ k ¡ (1 ¡ s)c + ¸f(1 ¡ a)(1 + ±)y0 ¡ b1g:
From after-tax income during period 0 we subtract k+(1¡s)c; which represents the
share of the cost of higher education that the family has to contribute.
The parameter ¸>0 expresses the rate at which parents discount their children’s
income. The greater is ¸; the more weight they give to the future income of the
children. This parameter can be seen as the degree of parents’ altruism. They will
agree to pay ¸ dollars of their after-tax income during period 0 if, by doing so, the
after-tax income of their o¤spring would increase by 1 dollar during period 1. If ¸<1
parents put more weight on their own income than on the future incomes of their
children. If the child is not at university, the utility is:
u(s;y0;±)=( 1¡ a)y0 ¡ b0 + ¸f(1 ¡ a)y0 ¡ b1g:
Parents will agree to pay the cost of university education provided v(s;y0;±) ¸
u(s;y0;±): This will be the case when the discounted post-tax increase in their child’s
income, thanks to higher education, is equal to or greater than the total cost borne
by the family. That is:
¸(1 ¡ a)±y0 ¸ (1 ¡ s)c + k:
Note that, even when s =1 ; not all families are willing to send their children to
university, as would be the case if k =0 : Certainly, if s =1and k =0 ; total cost of
education would be zero.
Let w(s;a)=
(1¡s)c+k
¸(1¡a) : This is a cut-o¤ value for ±y0: The value (1 ¡ a)w(s;a)
represents the net cost of education, in future value. Therefore, the families who
want to have their children at university are those with the characteristics (y0;±)
satisfying:
±y0 ¸ w(s;a):
7As ¸>0 and a<1 the term w(s;a) is well-de…ned: Note that w(s;a) increases








We de…ne b s(y0;±) as the minimum value of s that a family of characteristics (y0;±)








According to the value of b s(y0;±) the population can be partitioned into three groups:
(i) Those with b s(y0;±) > 1; or ±y0 <w (1;a):
(ii) Those with b s(y0;±) < 0; or ±y0 >w (0;a):
(iii) Those with 0 · b s(y0;±) · 1; or w(1;a) · ±y0 · w(0;a):
Group (i) contains all the families that would require a greater subsidy than the
maximum (s =1 )for their child to have access to higher education. In other words,
it contains all the families who will never enjoy higher education. Group (ii) re‡ects
the families that, contrary to (i), will be willing to send their child to university
even when s =0 : Finally, group (iii) is made up of all those families for whom their
decision is not independent of s; as it is for those in Groups (i) and (ii). They will
only send their child to university if s ¸ b s(y0;±).
We compute the proportion of families who wish to send their o¤spring to uni-
versity. We write this proportion as a function of s and a :




in which z = ±y0 and F(z) is the CDF of z (f(z) its density function).6 It is important
to remark that p(s;a) increases with s and decreases with a: This point makes the
basic trade-o¤ of the paper.
2.3 The Government’s Budget Constraints
We assume that the government cannot transfer funds from one period to another.
We also assume that, apart from redistribution, their only other expenditure is the




6If, for instance, both ± and y0 follow a Log-normal distribution this is also the case for z: In
particular if ± v LN(¹±;¾
2
±) and y0 v LN(¹y;¾
2
y) then z v LN(¹z;¾
2








8The term on the right represents total subsidies. From this equation we can obtain
the value of b0 that balances the constraint:
b0(s;a)=scp(s;a) ¡ ay0;
where y0 i st h em e a ni n c o m ei np e r i o d0 .
As b0(s;a) increases in s; to ensure that b0(s;a) · 0 for all s we must assume
that a ¸ c
¹ y0: In other words, we need a lower boundary for a that is higher than zero.
The fact that b0(s;a) is increasing in s means that, in absolute value, the lump-sum
transfer to all parents, decreases with s: This implies a reduction in the guaranteed
minimum income.
In Period 1, the government collects taxes for redistribution purposes only. The
value of b1 that balances the constraint is:
b1(s;a)=¡ay1(s;a);





As y1(s;a) increases in s; b1(s;a) decreases in s: That is, contrary to b0(s;a);
b1(s;a) increases in absolute value with s: As s increases with a …xed, taxes will
be lower for all children because the lump-sum transfer is larger. The guaranteed
minimum income will be larger.
2.4 Parents’ Political Decision
We attempt, here, to discover the level of subsidy that will be chosen collectively.
To do so, we assume that every family, when confronted with a choice between two
di¤erent levels of subsidy, will vote for the one that maximizes their indirect util-
ity function. We assume that the level of subsidy chosen by the society must be
a Condorcet winner. We call the level s¤ a Condorcet winner if, for all s 6= s¤;
U(s¤;y0;±) ¸ U(s;y0;±) for at least half of the population.
Let U(s;y0;±) be the indirect utility function of a family with the characteristics
(y0;±): This function will be di¤erent for each of the three types of families that we
had according to the particular values of b s(y0;±): First, families with b s(y0;±) > 1
will have U(s;y0;±)=u(s;y0;±) for all s 2 [0;1]: Second, families with b s(y0;±) < 0;
U(s;y0;±)=v(s;y0;±) for all s 2 [0;1]: Third, for those families with 0 · b s(y0;±) · 1:
U(s;y0;±)=
(
u(s;y0;±) for 0 · s<b s(y0;±)
v(s;y0;±) for b s(y0;±) · s · 1:
Empirical evidence suggests that one of these groups, namely the …rst one, constitutes
a majority. Such is the case when, even in the most favorable case, at least half of
9the families will decide not to send their children to university. This, in turn, means
that the proportion p(s;a) is bounded above by 1
2: In Spain, for example, with a
subsidy of about 0.8, in 1995, 77.2% of the young people between 15 and 24 years
were not at university (OECD average 82%). The next assumption introduces some
restrictions on the primitives of the model that lead us to a result that …ts that
empirical evidence.
Assumption 1 (i) f (z) is unimodal. (ii) Mode(z) · Median(z) <w (s;a):
The fact that Mode(z) · Median(z); under (i), means that the Median(z) is not
in the increasing part of f(z): The condition that Median(z) <w (s;a) guarantees
that p(s;a) < 1
2. To illustrate this assumption, suppose z is Log-normal. Then (i)
holds true. It is also true that Mode(z) · Median(z): Moreover, Median(z)=
exp(¹z); where ¹z i st h em e a ni nl o g a r i t h m so fz: As w(s;a) t a k e sv a l u e si nt h e
interval [ k
¸(1¡a); c+k
¸(1¡a)]; t h es e c o n dp a r to f( i i )r e q u i r e st h a ta ¸ 1 ¡ k
¸ exp(¡¹z):
Recall that the progressiveness of the tax system required also a ¸ c
¹ y0: Putting
together these two restrictions, we have that the marginal tax rate must satisfy
a ¸ amin =m a x
n
c




If the …rst group of families contains at least half of the population, we can prove
that a Condorcet winner always exists. To see this, note that all members in that
group have utility functions as follows:
U(s;y0;±)=u(s;y0;±)=( 1+¸)(1 ¡ a)y0 ¡ b0(s;a) ¡ ¸b1(s;a):
Only the …rst term of the utility function depends on the characteristics of the family.
This is due to the additive form of the utility function. Then, all the utility functions
of the individuals in that group will reach a maximum at the same value of s; that we
call s1: This will be the Condorcet winner. This value s1 is the one that maximizes
tax revenue, net of subsidies received, from the group that might send their children
to university.
Once we know that a Condorcet winner exists, the next step is to check whether
it is strictly positive or not. As the function u(s;y0;±) is continuous in the whole
interval [0,1], a su¢cient condition is that the …rst derivative of u(s;y0;±) at the point





The term on the left is the discounted increase in the future tax collection due to
a marginal increase in the subsidy. The term on the right measures the increase in
the total cost of higher education due to the marginal increase of the subsidy. If the
function u(s;y0;±) is strictly concave, that condition is also necessary. The condition
will fail if: (i) a or ¸ or both are small, or if the marginal increase in future income
is low; (ii) If c is large or the initial proportion of students is large.
10Having a Condorcet winner which is strictly positive is not enough for our pur-
poses, since we want to perform some exercises in comparative statics. Strict concav-
ity of u(s;y0;±) would help. The next result gives a condition under which u(s;y0;±)
is strictly concave on s (see the Appendix for a proof).









Then there is some value of the marginal tax rate b a; where 0 < b a · 1; such that if
a · b a both v(s;y0;±) and u(s;y0;±)are strictly concave functions on s:
Consider again the Log-normal case. The ratio ¡
f0(z)





and the condition holds. To illustrate further, if z follows a Pareto distribution with
shape parameter d>0; the ratio ¡
f0(z)
f(z) is d+1
z and the condition also holds. Finally,
we want to stress that a · b a is a su¢cient, but not necessary, condition for strict
concavity.
To illustrate the proposition and the restrictions on the parameters, we take
US data from 1989, when the median income was $28,906 while mean income was
$36,250. Accordingly, we specify y0 v LN(3:36;0:4624): With respect to ± we propose
a median value of 0.4 and a mean value of 0.5. This implies that college graduates
obtain, on average, a wage premium of 50% over those who do not graduate. Then,
± v LN(¡0:92;0:4463) and z v LN(2:44;0:9087): The National Center for Educa-
tional Statistics collects data on the cost of higher education. In 1989-90, average
undergraduate tuition and fees were $1,356 in public institutions, while average room
and board rates were $1,513 and $1,635, respectively.7 Then we …x c =$ 4 ;504: Fi-
nally we set k =$ 8 ;000: With these data we have that c
y0 =0 :124: We also compute
the values of amin and b a for di¤erent values of ¸: We collect them in Table 1:
Table 1
Extreme values of a





In what follows, we will assume that the conditions of Assumption 1 and Propo-
sition 1 hold, and that a · b a:
7See http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/digest97/d97t312.html
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This condition says that s1 must be such that, at the margin, the negative e¤ect
of the subsidy on the guaranteed minimum income for the parents counterbalances
the positive e¤ect of the subsidy on average income of the children. Another way of








We are interested in performing two exercises. The …rst is to examine the e¤ect
of a on s1 and the second, to study the e¤ect of ¸ on s1:
3.1 Changes in the Marginal Tax Rate
In our model, the marginal tax rate can be seen as a measure of future redistribution.
Higher education increases future income, but from every additional dollar a given
individual obtains, she must pay a in taxes. We want to see if a higher value of a
yields a higher value of the subsidy. To study this e¤ect of a; we apply the Implicit









As we are assuming that u(s;y0;±) is strictly concave, the sign of @s1
@a is the sign of
@2u(s1;y0;±)






























The …rst and second terms are positive. The …rst term re‡ects the fact that an
increase in a will reduce the proportion of students because families forecast that
the post-tax return from higher education will shrink. Its e¤ect is positive, since s
can be higher without increasing the total budget of higher education. The second
term re‡ects the discounted positive impact on tax collection in the future. The third
term, which is a second order e¤ect, may be either positive or negative. In general,
[a¸w(s1;a) ¡ cs1] will be negative when a is low and positive when a is large. The
12sign of the cross derivative of p(s1;a) is ambiguous. However we should expect it to
be negative. This means that as a grows, p(s;a) b e c o m e sl e s ss e n s i t i v et ov a r i a t i o n s
in s: In particular, this is the case when z follows a Lognormal distribution and




f0(w(s1;a))w(s1;a)] and that the sign of f(w(s1;a))+f0(w(s1;a))w(s1;a) is the sign
of ¹z ¡ ln(w(s1;a)):
Summing up, we have two …rst order e¤ects that are positive, and one second
order e¤ect whose sign is ambiguous. If the …rst order e¤ects dominate, the e¤ect
of a on s1 will be positive. To verify this, we calculate the value of s1 for di¤erent
values of the parameters. In every case, we have found a positive relation between
s1 and a. In fact, we have not found a single case in which s1 decreases with a (see
T a b l e2 ) .F o re a c hv a l u eo f¸ in the table, we also compute two reference values of
a; al and ah: The …rst one, al; is the maximum value of a for which s1 is zero. The
second one, ah; is the minimum value of a for which s1 is one.
Table 2
Optimal value of s1 for di¤erent combinations of a and ¸8
¸ =0 :25 ¸ =0 :5 ¸ =0 :75 ¸ =1
a =0 :124 0 (0.038) 0 (0.157) 0 (0.288)
a =0 :15 0 (0.036) 0 (0.15) 0 (0.277)
a =0 :35 0:356 (0.0259) 0:07 (0.096) 0 (0.188) 0 (0.284)
a =0 :45 0:82 (0.029) 0:622 (0.108) 0:43 (0.188) 0:24 (0.256)
a =0 :6 1 (0.0163) 1 (0.085) 1 (0.176) 1 (0.27)
al 0.278 (0.024) 0.338 (0.095) 0.381 (0.174) 0.415 (0.2467)
ah 0.49 (0.03) 0.525 (0.118) 0.551 (0.211) 0.572 (0.295)
Assuming a positive e¤ect of a on s1, that is, assuming that s1(a) is a non-
decreasing function on a; it is interesting to study the total e¤ect that the marginal
tax rate has on mean income in Period 1, which we can write as y1(s1(a);a): For the
sake of simplicity, and building on the …gures presented in Table 2, we assume that
al and ah are such that:
(i) amin · al <a h · 1:
(ii) For all a · al, s1(a)=0 :
(iii) For all a ¸ ah, s1(a)=1 :
(iv) For all a such that al <a<a h, 0 <s 1(a) < 1:
8The values of the parameters are c =$ 4 ;504;k=$ 8 ;000;z» LN(2:44;0:95): The numbers in
brackets are the proportions of students for the corresponding values of the parameters.
13Now we recall how y1(s;a) w a sd e … n e di nS e c t i o n2 : It is the integral of some
function that does not depend on either s or a: Only w(s;a) depends on such param-
eters. But then, all combinations (s;a) for which w(s;a) is constant, give rise to the
same value of y1(s;a).
In the …rst panel of Figure 1, we draw some level curves of y1(s;a) in the space
(a;s): They are straight lines with slope ¸
cw(s;a)=
(1¡s)c+k
c(1¡a) : In what follows, we
shall refer to these lines as constant-income lines. Note that the greater a is, the
greater the slope of the constant-income lines will be. This means that the increase
required in s to o¤set an increase in a; while leaving y1(s;a) unchanged, increases
with a: The bold line in the …gure represents s1(a):
The …rst thing that interests us now, is the following: To the left of al and to
the right of ah; the function y1(s1(a);a) decreases in a: The reason for this is that,
in these intervals, s1(a) is constant (either at 0 or at 1), and thus, any increase in a
lowers mean income in Period 1.
Let us de…ne a+ as the value of a at which y1(s1(a);a) attains a maximum in
the interval [al;a h] (see Figure 1): This is always well-de…ned. We want to check
whether a+ is a maximum of y1(s1(a);a) on the whole interval [amin;1]: This will not
b et h ec a s ew h e na+ = al: In this case the maximum of y1(s1(a);a) will be attained
at a = amin with a subsidy of zero. Let us now suppose a+ >a l as it happens in
Figure 1: The following proposition gives a condition under which y1(s1(a);a) attains
am a x i m u ma ta+.
Proposition 2 Let al;a h and a+ be as de…ned above. Then y1(s1(a);a) will attain
am a x i m u ma ta+ if and only if s1(a+) > (1 + k
c)(a+¡amin
1¡amin ):
Proof. All we need to prove is that, under the above condition, y1(s1(a);a) takes
a higher value at a+ than at amin: As we already know that s1(amin)=0 ; what we
need to prove is that the constant-income line that passes through (a+;s 1(a+)) repre-
sents a higher value of y1(s1(a);a) than the constant-income line that passes through
(amin;0): Or alternatively, that b s>0 where b s is de…ned such that y1(b s;amin)=
y1(s1(a+);a +): At the point (s1(a+);a +) the slope of the constant-income line will
be ¯+ =
(1¡s1(a+))c+k
c(1¡a+) : Therefore, b s = s1(a+)+¯+(amin ¡ a+): The value b s will be
greater than zero if, and only if, s1(a+) > (1+ k
c)(a+¡amin
1¡amin ): Note that, in particular,
this is what happens in Figure 1.
F o r… x e dv a l u e so famin and a+, the condition in the proposition will hold when-
ever k
c is su¢ciently low, in which case the constant-income lines become su¢ciently
‡atter. Recall that k represents the unsubsidized costs. For a high enough ratio
between implicit and explicit costs, it may be that the value of a that maximizes
y1(s1(a);a) is amin, at which point we already know that there will be zero subsidy.
An increase of the tax rate from amin to a+; although it raises s; does not reduce
education costs by much. The increase in s reduces only the explicit (subsidized)
14costs which are, in this case, a small fraction of the total costs. In particular this was
the case in the examples of Table 2.
In the second panel of Figure 1we also represent the values of y1(s1(a);a) for any
value of a; once we take the voting behavior of the population into account. Note
that it is quite similar to a La¤er curve. The di¤erence is that, in our model, the
e¢ciency costs arise, not because of the existence of distortions in the labor supply,
but because taxes reduce the demand for education. Moving to the right of a+; keeps
on increasing s; but this increase is not enough to o¤set the negative impact of the
increase in the tax rate.
Figure 1
3.2 Changes in the Level of Altruism
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The …rst term is negative. As in the study on the e¤ect of a on s1; t h es i g no ft h e
cross derivative of p(s1;a) is ambiguous. Contrary to that case, we should expect it
to be positive. If z follows a Lognormal distribution and w(s1;a) is to the right of
the median of z;
@2p(s1;a)
@s@¸ = ¡ c
¸2(1¡a)[f(w(s1;a)) + f0(w(s1;a))w(s1;a)]: Again, the
term [a¸w(s1;a) ¡ cs1] will be negative for low a; and positive for high a: In general,
the e¤ect of ¸ on s1 will be negative, provided that the …rst order e¤ect prevails.
The reason for this phenomenon is that there are two di¤erent e¤ects that can occur
in either direction, positive or negative. Firstly, as ¸ increases, more families decide
to send their children to university. More taxes are needed to cover the rise in the
budget for higher education, due to the in‡ux of new students. This is a negative
e¤ect on s1. Secondly, a greater value of ¸ means that parents put more weight on
an increase in their children’ future income, thanks to the increase in future transfers
15that they will receive. This has a positive e¤ect on s1: In the examples of Table 2
we …nd that the impact of ¸ on s1 is always negative. This is remarkable, since, in
principle, our intuition would assume a positive relationship.
4 Final Comments and Criticisms
In our model there are only two ways for parents of transferring resources to their
children. One is to pay for the education of their own children. The other is to invest
in other families’ children and, in that way, in‡uence the size of the guaranteed
minimum income the children will obtain in the future. We prove that this second
type of investment will be carried out, provided that the future marginal tax rate
is high enough. One possible di¢culty with this is the following. Suppose parents
could transfer resources to their children via cash. Would the results still maintain?
The answer is positive, but this is due to the form of the utility functions. As long
as a>0 and ¸<1; the optimal bequest is always zero. To address properly this
problem we would need a more sophisticated model, at the risk of facing a problem
of non existence of a voting equilibrium.
The subsidies we have studied in this paper are obviously very simplistic. They
are conveniently independent of income. In general, however, subsidies are income-
dependent. Students from low-income families receive grants. Nevertheless, once
income has reached a certain level, the subsidy is constant: people in the middle-
income group who are not eligible for grants, pay the same fees as those in higher, and
even much higher income levels. In any case, the introduction of subsidies dependent
on income would complicate the problem, since, in such a case, voters would have to
choose policies from a multi-dimensional space, giving rise to the usual problem of
non-existence of equilibrium.
In this paper we have made allowance for people to vote on the amount of the
subsidy, while the level of the marginal tax rate remains …xed. If people are also
allowed to vote on the level of the marginal tax rate, we come up against a similar
problem to the one mentioned above.
Another related weakness in our model is that voters believe that the marginal
tax rate will remain unchanged in the future. Note that in our model everything
depends on the future tax rate rather than on the current one. To be more speci…c,
what is the expected future tax rate is what matters most. To deal adequately with
this problem, a detailed description of how expectations on the future tax rate are
formed would be required. In our model, we choose the simplest possible way of doing
this. We assume that everybody believes that the marginal tax rate will be exactly
what the current one is.
Finally, the main drawback of the model is its static nature. In a dynamic frame-
work, voters should take into account that the positive e¤ect of s on future income
16may also, in the next period, increase the proportion of students, making the given
s u b s i d ym o r ec o s t l y . T h er i s ei nt h ec o s to fe d u c a t i o nw i l lr e d u c et h eg u a r a n t e e d
minimum income. These two e¤ects have opposite signs and the …nal result might
be ambiguous.
17APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
















terms, this is the same as:
¸(2 ¡ a)f (w(s;a)) > (sc ¡ a¸w(s;a))f0 (w(s;a));
or
¸(2 ¡ a)f (w(s;a)) >
sc ¡ a(c + k)
(1 ¡ a)
f0 (w(s;a)):
By Assumption 1, f0 (w(s;a)) < 0: If sc ¡ a(c + k) ¸ 0 or a · c
c+ks we are done.





¸(2 ¡ a)(1 ¡ a)




a(c+k)¡sc : We know that for all s and for all a> c




@a2 > 0 and
@B(s;a)
@s > 0. Moreover lima! c
c+ksB(s;a)=+ 1 and
lima!1B(s;a)=0for all s.N o wc a l lM(s;a)=¡
f0(w(s;a))
f(w(s;a)) : We have that M(s;a) ¸ 0
for all (s;a) and 0 <M(s; c
c+ks) < +1 for all s: By the condition in the proposition,
we know that lima!1M(s;a)=0 : Now we …x s: As both B(s;a) and M(s;a) are
continuous on a t h e r ea r et w op o s s i b l ec a s e s :( i )B(s;a) and M(s;a) cross at some
value (or values) of a;( i i )M(s;a) is below B(s;a) for all a. If they cross, we call
b a(s) the minimum value of a at which those functions cross. In the second case we
set b a(s)=1 : Finally we take b a =m i n sfb a(s)g: By construction, it must be that for all
a<b a; u00(s)=v00(s) < 0: In general, we cannot say anything about the relationship
between b a(s) and s: However, if we consider the Lognormal case, then b a(s) is an
increasing function on s and thus, b a = b a(0):
18Figure 1. Relationship between a and mean income in period 1. The
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